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3 233
of the reasons relied upon in revoking probation.

,PAROLE

The purpose of parole is to integrate prisoners into society by allowing

them to serve a portion of their sentences outside prison. 3234 While on parole, the parolee is subject to the continuing supervision

235

of a parole or

probation officer and to the conditions and rules imposed. 3236 These conditions may significantly restrain the parolee's freedom. 3237 If a parolee vio3233. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. at 612; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786; see United States v. Holland,
850 F.2d 1048, 1050 (5th Cir. 1988) (although probationer admitted violation, failure of court to
provide written statement setting forth its reasons for revocation violated due process); United
States v. Smith, 767 F.2d 521, 524 (8th Cir. 1985) (although hearing transcript existed, requirement
that probationer be given written statement of reasons for revocation not satisfied when impossible
to determine from record reasons for revocation).
3234. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). Parole also reduces the costs society must
bear for the confinement of criminals and eases the pressure on overcrowded prisons. Id.
3235. See Taylor v. United States Parole Comm'n, 734 F.2d 1152, 1153 (6th Cir. 1984) (parole is
convict's conditional release before term's expiration, subject to appropriate public authority's continuing supervision and reimprisonment for violation of parole conditions).
3236. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, the sentencing judge imposes conditions, in contrast to
previous law, which gave the Parole Commission that responsibility. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)
(Supp. IV 1986) (articulating conditions sentencing judge may impose) with 18 U.S.C. § 4209
(1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 1987,
2027 (articulating conditions Parole Commission may impose). Parole conditions are designed to
ensure that the parolee is adequately supervised and that the public welfare is protected. See United
States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir.) (parole officers serve dual function of protecting
societal interests and helping rehabilitate parolee), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).
Under new law after the Sentencing Reform Act, the probation officer replaces the parole officer
as the direct supervising authority for parolees. 18 U.S.C. § 3603(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Prisoners
incarcerated before Nov. 1, 1987, however, will be supervised under the old law until Nov. 1, 1992.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2032 reprintedin 18 U.S. C.
§ 3551 note (Supp. IV 1986).
3237. See United States v. Kreager, 711 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (no abuse of
discretion to impose parole condition requiring parolee to file delinquent income tax returns); Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1983) (parole condition forbidding parolee from traveling
to former state of residence permissible when evidence indicated he threatened several individuals
there). A parolee has a lesser privacy expectation than a normal citizen and therefore a more
limited sphere of fourth amendment protections. See United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 12324 (2d Cir.) (parole officer's examination in his office of parolee's forearm for needle injection marks
and subsequent search of his person and clothing not violation of parolee's privacy expectation),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 846 (1984); United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1982) (parole
officer's deceptive seizure of parolee's handwriting and typewriting sample permissible when based
on reasonable suspicion); United States v. Pagel, 854 F.2d 267, 271-72 (7th Cir. 1988) (warrantless
stop and search of parolee's car which was in possession of parolee's friend permissible when parole
officer had searched parolee's home and found gun different from gun parolee suspected of having);
United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1984) (parolee's arrest upheld when officer,
suspecting criminal activity, entered hotel room after discovering that parolee was not at registered
address, because society's interest in apprehending parole violators outweighs parolee's privacy interest), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1019 (1985); cf Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3169 (1987)
(warrantless search of probationer's residence based on "reasonable grounds" permissible under
fourth amendment and reflects supervisory nature of relationship). But see United States v. Brad-
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lates a parole condition, the parole may be revoked and the parolee
reincarcerated. 3238 .

Repeal of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act.
The law
governing parole of federal prisoners before November 1, 1987, was the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 ("PCRA"). 3239 The
PCRA was repealed, effective November 1, 1987,3240 and replaced by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.3241
Although the Sentencing Reform Act became effective November 1, 1987,
the Parole Commission and corresponding statutory provisions related to parole will govern prisoners who committed crimes before November 1, 1987,
until November 1, 1992.3242 Before the end of this five-year period, the Pa-

role Commission must set a release date for all individuals incarcerated
under the PCRA. 324 3 The Parole Commission may give prisoners the option

of being released under the Sentencing Reform Act if that sentence would be
ley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir. 1978) (parole officer must secure warrant before searching parolee's
residence).
,3238. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4213(a)(2) & 4214(d)(5) (1982) (repealed 1984). Upon parole revocation, the
parolee may be required to forfeit his good time credits earned prior to parole revocation. Thompson v. Lacey, 817 F.2d 1315,1317 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see Culp v. Keohane, 822 F.2d 641,
642 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (prisoner reincarcerated for parole violation need not be credited
with "good time" earned prior to parole).
3239. Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1982)
(repealed 1984)).
3240. Sentencing Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-217, § 4, 99 Stat. 1728, reprintedin
18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (Supp. IV 1986) (delaying effective date of Sentencing Reform Act one year
to Nov. 1, 1987).
3241. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 1987, 2027 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (Supp. IV 1986). In general, the Sentencing Reform Act's purpose is to modernize criminal sentencing and minimize reliance on the rehabilitative model of sentencing. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 38-39, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 221-22. The Act is also intended to reduce the sentencing dispar-

ity under old law and to provide greater certainty for prisoners in their release date calculations. Id.
3242. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2032 (1984), reprinted
in 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (Supp. IV 1986) (chapter 311 to remain in effect for five years after Sentencing Reform Act takes effect); see Romano v. Luther, 816 F.2d 832, 837-39 (2d Cir. 1987) (fiveyear transition period starts on effective date of Sentencing Reform Act).
Although the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act has been repealed by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, §§ 218(a), 225, 98 Stat. 1987, 2027, the cases decided
under the old law have been retained for the benefit of those Criminal Procedure Project users
eligible for parole under the old law.
3243. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 189 & n.430, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3372 & n.430; see Romano v. Luther, 816 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1987) (provision
requiring Parole Commission to set release dates after five years became effective on Sentencing
Reform Act's effective date: Nov. 1, 1987); Kele v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (same). The Parole Commission need not set the parole release date within the prisoner's
applicable guidelines, but it must be early enough to permit the parolee to appeal before the end of
the transitional period. Romano v. Luther, 816 F.2d at 839. Prisoners who will be on parole or
mandatory supervised release before November 1, 1992, are not entitled to a release date set under
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Under the PCRA, the Parole Board had the power to release a prisoner on
a supervised basis before he had fully served his sentence. 324 5 Any conditions
imposed could only be in effect for the remainder of the sentence. 3246 In

contrast, under the Sentencing Reform Act, the prisoner must serve the actual length of his sentence and, additionally, a term of supervised release
after his term of imprisonment if the sentencing judge requires it.3247 The
court must order a term of supervised release when a sentence of imprisonment for more than one year is imposed and may order a term of supervised
release for lesser sentences. 3248 , Furthermore,_ the Sentencing Reform Act

specifies various factors for the sentencing judge'to considir in determining
3249
A judge
the defendant's need for supervision after release from prison.
3250
year.
may terminate the term of supervised release after one

The United States Sentencing Commission has developed guidelines to

help judges decide the length of a supervised release. 325 1 The guidelines re-

quire terms ranging from one year for misdemeanors and less serious felonies

to five years for more serious felonies. 32 52 .The Sentencing Reform Act also
allows a judge to impose any condition reasonably related to the Act's policy
goals or to any guidelines promulgated by the Commission.3 253 In addition,
the judge must order the defendant not to commit another violation of the
3254
law while on supervised release.
Under the new law, probation officers replace parole officers in supervising
the Sentencing Reform Act. Lightsey v. Kastner, 846 F.2d 329, 332 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1988); Miller
v. Story, 814 F.2d 320, 320-21 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Kele v. Carlson, 854 F.2d at'340.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1987 in clarifying the Parole Commission's role, provides that the
Commission must set parole release dates pursuant to its general parole release statute. Sentencing
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2(b)(2), 101 Stat. 1266, 1266 (1987).
3244. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 189 & n.430, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3372 & n.430.

3245. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1982) (repealed 1984).
3246. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 122-25, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3305-08 (discussing PCRA provisions and changes under new law).
3247. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (Supp. IV 1986) ;see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1,at 122-24 (discussing
how supervised release is separate component of defendant's sentence), reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3306-07.
3248. Sentencing Guidelines, § 5D3.1, supra note 1.
3249. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (Supp. IV 1986) (factors include offense's nature and circumstances,
defendant's history and characteristics, need for deterrence, public protection, and defendant's need
for educational or vocational training), amended by Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182,
§ 9, 101 Stat. 1266, 1267 (1987).
3250. See id. § 3583(e) (governing term or condition modification).
3251. See generally Sentencing Guidelines,supra note 1.
3252. Id. § 5D3.2.
3253. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (Supp IV 1986) (conditions must be-reasonably related to seriousness
of offense, adequacy of deterrence, and provision of vocational training).
3254. Id.
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the released prisoners. 3255 The probation officer must provide the prisoner
with a clear statement of the conditions of the supervision. 3 256 Any violation

can be construed as contempt of court 3257 and may justify the imposition of
sanctions. 3258 The court must revoke probation upon finding a violation of
supervised release involving new criminal conduct, unless the criminal con3259
duct only constitutes a petty offense
Parole Under the ParoleCommission and ReorganizationAct.
The Parole Commission's discretion to release a defendant is very broad. 32 60 A federal prisoner sentenced to a definite term exceeding one year, is normally
eligible for parole after serving one-third of the sentence. 32 61 A prisoner serving a life sentence or a sentence exceeding thirty years is eligible for parole
after serving ten years. 3262 The circuits are in disagreement, however, as to
whether the sentencing judge may specify a mandatory minimum incarcera-

tion term that exceeds ten years.3263 The sentencing judge also has the au3255. Id.; S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 125, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
3308.
3256. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
3257. Id. § 3583(e)(2); see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 125, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3308 (discussing availability of contempt orders pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 401(3)).
3258. Id. Congress intended that for most violations, criminal contempt proceedings would be
adequate. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 1, at 125, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3308. A court may modify the conditions upon violations. Id.
3259. Sentencing Guidelines, § 7A1.3, supra note 1.
3260. See Bryant v. Warden, 776 F.2d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 1985) (Parole Commission has broad
discretion to grant or deny parole, as well as to determine weight of mitigating factors; Parole
Commission need not credit chronic parole violator with excess time served on previous parole
violator term), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023 (1986); Goble v. Matthews, 814 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (6th
Cir. 1987) (Parole Commission's power to implement statutory provisions for parole is .'broad' ";
therefore, Commission may reaffirm presumptive release date based on inadvertently overlooked file
information) (quoting Williams v. United states Parole Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir.
1983)); Turner v. Henman, 829 F.2d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1987) (because parole decisions committed to agency discretion, prisoner challenging Commission's alleged failure to follow its own regulations and rules in determining his parole date not entitled to habeas relief unless some constitutional
provision also violated); Turner v. United States Parole Comm'n, 810 F.2d 612, 617 (7th Cir. 1987)
(dictum) (Parole Commission, in its discretion, need not grant parole even when court reduced
minimum sentence to time served); ef Kramer v. Jenkins, 800 F.2d 708, 709 (7th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (when prisoner appeals from Parole Commission's decision to deny parole, court will grant
bail only in exceptional circumstances).
3261. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982) (repealed 1984).
3262. Id.
3263. Courts have read 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) conjunctively to permit
the trial judge to prescribe a minimum incarceration period exceeding ten years if it serves the ends
of justice and the public interest. See Rothgeb v. United States, 789 F.2d 647, 652-53 (8th Cir.
1986) (upholding 69-year minimum prison term); United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 138788 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding requirement that defendant serve at least 30 years of 90-year sentence), cert denied,479 U.S. 1104 (1987); United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589, 598-600 (10th
Cir. 1985) (upholding 99-year minimum prison term requirement), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020
NEws at
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thority to specify that the prisoner will be eligible for parole before having
served one-third of the sentence. 3264 Alternatively, the sentencing judge may
set a maximum term and allow the Parole Commission to determine when
3 65
the prisoner should be released.
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 19703266
requires judges to supplement sanctions for certain narcotics violations with
supervised release terms of at least five years if the defendant has no prior
convictions, or at least ten years if there are prior convictions. 32 67 If a parolee violates a condition of supervised release, the parolee's original sentence
may be increased by the length of this supervised release term, with no reduced sentence for time spent on special parole. 326 8 Courts have uniformly

held that the special parole terms violate neither the due process clause nor
3269
separation of powers.

Before the Parole Commission may parole an eligible prisoner, it must determine that the prisoner has an acceptable record of institutional behavior. 3270 If the prisoner meets this threshold requirement, the Parole
(1986); United States v. Berry, 839 F.2d 1487, 1488 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (upholding 59year minimum prison term). But see United States v. Castonguay, 843 F.2d 51, 54-56 (Ist Cir.
1988) (absent indication that Congress intended to give courts carte blanche to extend parole eligibility dates without limit, court not authorized to set minimum incarceration term of 25 years when
sentencing defendant to 75-year term); United States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 523 (7th Cir. 1988)
(sentencing judge not entitled to impose 50-year minimum incarceration with sentence of life plus
150 years because sentencing judge cannot set minimum term beyond ten years).
3264. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) (1982) (repealed 1984) (court imposing sentence exceeding one year
may designate minimum term, not exceeding one-third of maximum sentence, after which prisoner
eligible for parole). But cf United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 535, 544 (1lth Cir. 1985) (authority to
determine length of prisoner's confinement vested in Parole Commission, not trial judge; sentence
not illegal when judge mistakenly believed defendant would be released before end of sentence), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986); King v. United States Parole Comm'n, 744 F.2d 1449, 1451 (1lth Cir.
1984) (sentencing court has no authority to order particular release date; judge's recommendation
that any parole revocation sentence not exceed four-year adult term not binding on Parole
Commission).
3265. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1982) (repealed 1984) (court imposing sentence exceeding one year
may fix maximum term and specify that Parole Commission determine when to grant parole).
3266. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982), repealed
by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 2030, 2031, reprintedin 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551 note (Supp. IV 1986)).
3267. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1982) (repealed 1984). The statute provides for a minimum
special parole term, but no maximum, which presumably would be life.
3268. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c) (1982) (repealed 1984).
3269. See United States v. Butler, 763 F.2d 11, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1985) (twelve-year special parole
term for conviction on three narcotics counts not due process violation); Walberg v. United States,
763 F.2d 143, 147-49 (2d Cir. 1985) (eight-year special parole term for conviction on three narcotics
counts not unconstitutionally vague under due process clause); United States v. Arellanes, 767 F.2d
1353, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1985) (ten-year special parole term for conviction on two narcotics counts
not unconstitutionally vague or unlawful delegation of legislative power to judicial branch); United
States v. Carcaise, 763 F.2d 1328, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 1985) (three-year special parole term for
conviction on five narcotics counts not violation of due process clause or separation of powers).
3270. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1982) (repealed 1984); 28 C.F.R. § 2.18 (1986) (substantial obser-
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Commission must determine that the release would not detract from the seriousness of the prisoner's offense, 327 1 promote disrespect for the law, 3272 or
jeopardize the public welfare. 3273 In order to make such determinations, the

PCRA authorizes the Parole Commission to consider information supplied
by the prisoner, the incarcerating institution, the sentencing judge, and the
psychological examiner, including the prisoner's criminal record, 32 74 the
presentence investigation report, 3275 the parole status of the prisoner's
vance of prison rules is prerequisite to parole release); see Nunez-Guardado v. Hadden, 722 F.2d
618, 624 (10th Cir. 1983) (weight to be accorded prisoner's conduct is matter of Parole Commission's discretion; decision to go beyond guidelines in face of favorable institutional record not abuse
of discretion); Jonas v. Wainwright, 779 F.2d 1576, 1577 (11 th Cir.) (upholding Parole and Probation Commission's decision to move back prisoner's presumptive parole date because prisoner's
escape from prison cofistituted unacceptable behavior), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830 (1986).
3271. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a)(1),(1982) (repealed 1984); see Resnick v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 835 F.2d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1987) (good cause requirement satisfied when prisoner
denied parole because of conviction on several crimes, including drug conspiracy and two murders,
because grant of present parole would depreciate seriousness of offenses, notwithstanding very
favorable penitentiary record).
3272. Id.
3273. Id. § 4206(a)(2); see Schramm v. United States Parole Comm'n, 767 F.2d 509, 511-12 (8th
Cir. 1985) (consideration of whether prisoner's release would jeopardize public welfare does not
require Parole Commission to distinguish between prisoners with prior misdemeanor convictions
and those with prior felony convictions; therefore, no abuse of discretion when prisoner with record
of burglary and nonviolent misdemeanors received same salient factor score as prisoners with several violent felonies).
3274. See Schramm v. United States Parole Comm'n, 767 F.2d 509, 512 (8th Cir. 1985) (Parole
Commission's consideration of prisoner's prior misdemeanor convictions does not increase punishment for them, and thus is not violation of ex post facto clause).
3275. See Ochoa v. United States, 819 F.2d 366, 373 (2d Cir. 1987) (prisoner's due process rights
not violated by hearsay statements in presentence report when he had opportunity to testify at
hearing and submit additional information); United States v. Ursillo, 786 F.2d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 1986)
(when prisoner alleged false representations in presentence report, Parole Commission given discretion to resolve factual disputes therein and consider information in prisoner's presentence report
accordingly); Montgomery v. United States Parole Comm'n, 838 F.2d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (Commission can rely on any information in presentence report that was not disavowed by
sentencing court, because court will not reassess credibility of information used by Commission in
classifying offenses); Melvin v. Petrovsky, 720 F.2d 9, 10-11 (8th Cir. 1983) (Parole Commission
may consider presentence report valuing thefts at $560,000 when indictment valued thefts at
$96,000); Walker v. United States, 816 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (evidence in
presentence report need not meet trial evidentiary standards); Anderson v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 793 F.2d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 1986) (Parole Commission's consideration of history of
violence in prisoner's presentence report in setting severity rating and salient factor score not due
process violation); Jones v. United States, 783 F.2d 1477, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986) (Parole Commission's consideration of contested information in prisoner's presentence report permissible when prisoner failed to establish that information was false and that Parole Commission actually relied on it);
Robinson v. Hadden, 723 F.2d 59, 61-62 (10th Cir. 1983) (Parole Commission may consider
presentence report that contained four dismissed bank robbery counts), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906
(1984); cf Lynch v. United States Parole Comm'n, 768 F.2d 491, 498-99 (2d Cir. 1985) (inmate's
due process rights violated when Parole Commission failed to disclose presentence report to counsel).
The Supreme Court has determined that the Freedom of Information Act requires that the Commission disclose presentence reports to the defendant. United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 108
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codefendants, 3276 and any other relevant information. 3277 The Parole Com-

mission has promulgated guidelines to foster consistency and fairness in its
S. Ct. 1606, 1612 (1988) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1927 & Supp. 1988)). Information relating to
confidential sources, diagnostic opinions, and other information that may cause harm to the defendant or third parties is exempted from the disclosure requirement. Id. at 1611. The Sentencing
Reform Act grants the defendant an automatic right to the information in his files. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3552(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
3276. See Lynch v. United States Parole Comm'n, 768 F.2d 491; 497 (2d Cir. 1985) (within
Parole Commission's discretion to consider parole status of felon's codefendants); cf. Sheary v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 822 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1987) (due process rights of prisoner
with six-year sentence not violated when he received less favorable parole consideration than
codefendant with three-year sentence); Augustine v. Brewer, 821 F.2d 365, 372 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Commission has discretion to make prisoner serve one year longer than codefendant when prisoner
participated in conspiracy for one year longer than codefendant); Coleman v. Perrill, 845 F.2d 876,
879 (9th Cir. 1988) (Commission not bound to follow its own internal regulations concerning treatment disparity of codefendant, because similar treatment for codefendants is one of Commission's
aspirations and not one of its requirements).
3277. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1982) (repealed 1984)); see Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 937 (3d
Cir. 1988) (Commission can consider amount of narcotics involved in prisoner's criminal activity in
determining parole eligibility even though indictments did not specifically charge any amount);
Hackett v. United States Parole Comm'n, 851 F.2d 127, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (Parole
Commission can consider victim's unsubstantiated rape allegations in setting prisoner's presumptive
parole date, even though sentencing court stated it did not consider allegation when setting sentence); Augustine v. Brewer, 821 F.2d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1987) (Commission free to consider
information not contained in indictment when prosecution did not expressly make representations
during plea bargaining to defendant concerning parole prospects); Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd.,
769 F.2d 396, 400-02 (7th Cir. 1985) (board allowed to consider newspaper articles pertaining to
prisoner's crimes), cert.-denied,474 U.S. 1065 (1986); Mullen v. United States Parole Comm'n, 756
F.2d 74, 75 (8th Cir. 1985) (Parole Commission not limited by state court's dismissal of weapons
charge when it made independent findings that violdtion occurred); Otsuki v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 777 F.2d 585, 586-87 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (Parole Commission may, but is not
obligated to, consider prisoner's "superior program achievement" status); Nunez-Guardado v. Hadden, 722 F.2d 618, 622 (10th Cir. 1983) (Parole Commission may consider evidence related to
thirteen deaths contained in counts dismissed during plea bargaining, when no express or implied
agreement that such information would not be considered and prisoner given opportunity to challenge evidence). But cf. Donn v. Baer, 828 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir.. 1987) (prisoner's performance in
state prison system would have little, if any, significance in Commission's post-revocation consideration of parole on federal violator term); Dunn v. United States Parole Comm'n,. 818 F.2d 742, 745
(10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (Parole Commission not allowed to use insanity acquittal in determining only whether release would encourage disrespect for law or detract from offense's seriousness;
there must be risk of assaultive behavior based on current mental illness); Paz v. Warden, 787 F.2d
469, 473 (10th Cir. 1986) (Parole Commission not allowed to base decision on prisoner's unwillingness to confess to crime with which prisoner had not been formally charged); Gholston v. Jones,
848 F.2d 1156, 1160 (11th Cir. 1988) (parolee's depression and medication had little relevance and
could not be considered by Parole Commission in evaluating sole charge of failing to "not violate
any law").
The Department of Justice regulations also authorize the Parole Commission to consider information supplied by defense attorneys, prosecutors, and other interested parties. 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(d)
(1986). The Department of Justice has recommended that United States Attorneys inform the Parole Commission of charges dropped during plea bargaining and the degree of defendant's cooperation. See PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (July 1980), at 55-56. The Justice Department
has also recommended that United States Attorneys furnish a transcript of the sentencing proceedings to the defendant. Id.
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parole determinations. 3278 Under these guidelines, the Parole Commission
has established a formula for determining when a prisoner may be released

on parole. 3279 The Parole Commission determines the prisoner's parole prospects by calculating a prisoner's "salient factor score" 3280 and then classifying the offense according to a chart listing categories of severity.3 28' The
matrix of the prisoner's offense severity rating and the salient factor score
328 2
yields the suggested time range of incarceration before release on parole.

3 283
In some cases, the Parole Commission may deviate from the guidelines.

3278. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(a) (1985).
3279. Id.
3280. Id. § 2.20(e). The salient factor score focuses on the offender's characteristics, includes the
inmate's history of criminal behavior, age, and drug usage, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 notes, and attempts to
predict the potential parole violation risk. Id. § 2.20(e); see Allen v. Hadden, 738 F.2d 1102, 110304 (10th Cir. 1984) (discussing the formula's application).
3281. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(b) (1986). The severity of offenses ranges from "Category 1" (formerly
"low severity"), which includes violations such as mere possession of illicit drugs, to "Category 8"
(formerly "greatest severity"), which includes offenses such, as murder and treason. Id. The Commission may consider mitigating and aggravating circumstances when determining the offense severity level. Id. § 2.20(d); see Augustine v. Brewer, 821 F.2d 365, 368-69, 371 (7th Cir. 1987) (in
determining offense severity rating, Commission can consider information about drug conspiracy
not contained in indictment when defendant pleaded guilty; Commission may include nature and
duration of criminal conduct at issue in determining presence of aggravating circumstances); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 1987) (in determining severity rating, Commission not limited to trial evidence); Bowen v. United States Parole Comm'n, 805 F.2d 885, 888 (9th
Cir. 1986) (consideration of unadjudicated allegations in determining severity rating not due process violation); cf Schramm v United States Parole Comm'n, 767 F.2d 509, 511-12 (8th Cir. 1985)
(Parole Commission with its wide discretion can give same severity rating to both prior misdemeanor and felony). But see Ceniceros v. United States Parole Comm'n, 837 F.2d 1358, 1361 (5th
Cir. 1988) (Commission may not consider specific conduct in evaluating prisoner's offense severity
rating when jury has acquitted prisoner for that same conduct, because jury has necessarily determined that prisoner did not engage in that conduct).
3282. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(b) (1986). The time ranges fixed by the guidelines are predicated on good
institutional adjustment and program progress. Id. There are separate guidelines for prisoners
sentenced under the Narcotic Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982); 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(h)(2)
(1986). See Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 949 (3d Cir. 1988) (prisoner incarcerated for cocaine
sale not entitled to be assigned middle range of parole eligibility under guidelines merely because
amount of cocaine possession was within middle range of offense severity index).
3283. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1982) (repealed 1984) (Commission may grant or deny parole
notwithstanding guidelines if good cause exists, provided it gives prisoner notice); see Patterson v.
Gunnell, 753 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (Parole Commission has discretion to set minimum
confinement above what guidelines prescribe even if it previously chose not to exceed higher guidelines that had been incorrectly applied to prisoner); Hackett v. United States Parole Comm'n, 851
F.2d 127, 131 (6th Cir. 1988) (court cannot substitute its judgement for that of Commission as to
what constitutes good cause for departing from guidelines; victim's unsubstantiated rape allegations
were legitimate consideration when determining presumptive parole date); Merki v. Sullivan, 853
F.2d 599, 600-01 (8th Cir. 1988) (Commission could consider general implications of prisoner's
association with paramilitary organization to set presumptive parole date beyond guidelines even
though 17 of 21 counts were dropped and government had entered plea agreement to fully and
accurately inform Commission of prisoner's cooperation in government investigation); Coleman v.
Perrill, 845 F.2d 876, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1988) (showing of good cause, which requires that Commission advance in good faith reasons that are not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, irrelevant, or
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Courts employ two different standards in reviewing Parole Commission decisions to make such deviations. Several circuits have held that courts have
the power to decide whether the Commission properly weighed the factors in
making its decision. Even if the Commission stayed within its statutory
power, therefore, a court may reverse the decision if it finds that the Com-

mission failed to meet a certain standard of rationality. 3284 The second view,

capricious, satisfied when parolee violated prohibition against association with convicted criminals
and engaged in high speed chase to elude police). But see Joost v. United States Parole Comm'n,
698 F.2d 418, 419 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (Parole Commission must furnish more than standard reason to justify parole denial that exceeds guidelines and must show good cause for continued
incarceration; Commission must rebut allegations that it relied on murder charges of which petitioner was acquitted). Many courts prohibit the Parole Commission from using factors to justify
exceeding the guideline recommendations for a parolee if those factors were used in determining the
severity category or salient factor score. Such practice is called "double counting" and is an impermissible abuse of discretion. Cf Maddox v. United States Parole Comm'n, 821 F.2d_997, 1002 (5th
Cir. 1987) (use of possession of 96,000 pounds of marijuana used to satisfy 20,000 pound severity
requirement and to support exceeding the guidelines not double counting); Romano v. Baer, 805
F.2d 268, 271 (7th Cir. 1986) (use of characteristics peculiar to RICO and Hobbs Act violations as
aggravating factors not double counting when not used in placing prisoner in severity category);
Coleman v. Perrill, 845 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of high speed chase to elude police as
aggravating factor not double counting when offense severity rating based on reckless driving);
Walker v. United States, 816 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (use of number of convictions to arrive at salient factor score, and use of nature and circumstances of offenses to exceed
guidelines not double counting); Ammirato v. Hanberry, 797 F.2d 961, 962 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (use of multiple offenses to elevate offense to greatest severity category and to extend release
date beyond guidelines not double counting when many offenses fell to severity just below greatest,
prisoner's conduct was well beyond greatest, and prisoner was involved in sophisticated and continuing criminal activity).
3284. Many courts, therefore, will reverse the Commission if it abuses its discretion or acts "arbitrarily" or "capriciously." See Misasi v. United States Parole Comm'n, 835 F.2d 754, 758 (10th Cir.
1987) (abuse of discretion to fix prisoner's parole eligibility date at 60 months rather than at the 1420 months specified under parole guidelines, when one reason given factually incorrect, other reason insufficiently specific to support departure, and neither supported by United States Attorney's
report upon which Commission placed sole reliance in ordering departure); Paz v. Warden, 787
F.2d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1986) (abuse of discretion to demand prisoner's confession as prerequisite
to determining sufficient rehabilitation for parole); cf Lynch v. United States Parole Comm'n, 768
F.2d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 1985) (Commission's determination that prisoner was to be continued to
another hearing in 1991 because earlier release would detract from seriousness of offense not abuse
of discretion); Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 950 (3d Cir. 1988) (Commission justified in placing prisoner in poorest eligibility position within his offense severity index, because rearrest for
second offense of selling cocaine while on bail from another cocaine-related offense demonstrated
prisoner's lack of remorse); Augustine v: Brewer, 821 F.2d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1987) (aggregation of
direct and indirect involvement in drug trafficking conspiracy not abuse of discretion so long as
vicarious responsibility for which prisoner held accountable involved acts over which prisoner exercised some control or which reasonably could have been foreseen); Kele v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 775 F.2d 243, 244-45 (8th Cir. 1985) (no abuse of discretion when Parole Commission set
parole date 152 months later than presumptive release date, guidelines open ended and decision
based on severity of offense); Schramm v. United States Parole Comm'n, 767 F.2d 509, 512 (8th Cir.
1985) (Commission's practice of giving dttempted bank robbery and bank robbery same severity
classification not abuse of discretion); Moore v. Dubois, 848 F.2d 1115, 1116 (10th Cir. 1988) (no
abuse of discretion when Commission reviewing revocation hearing without receiving live testimony
rejected credibility determination of hearing examiner as to whether victim had truthfully reported
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consistently embraced by. the Ninth Circuit, is that courts can only decide
whether the Commission weighed the proper factors in making its decision;

the Commission's substantive decisions are unreviewable even for abuse of
discretion. 328 5 In either case, when the Parole Commission departs from

procedural requirements of the PCRA, its actions violate the statute only if
328 6

they prejudice the prisoner.
Application of the PCRA guidelines to prisoners sentenced prior to the
PCRA's enactment does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex
postfacto laws.3 28 7 Nor may prisoners seek. resentencing because the Parole
that parolee had raped her); Tobon v. Martin, 809 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(Commission's consideration of drug dealer's weapon possession as aggravating circumstance sufficient to justify deviation from presumptive parole date not abuse of discretion); Whitehead v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1536, 1537 (11th Cir. 1985) (Commission finding parole
violation because of state criminal pandering charge not abuse of discretion in parole revocation
decision).
3285. The Ninth Circuit has taken the position that Congress intended that substantive decisions
by the Parole Commission be unreviewable. See Walker v. United States, 816 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (no jurisdiction to scrutinize Commission decisions exceeding guideline
range of 60 to 72 months when no double counting); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1176,
1179 (9th Cir. 1987) (no jurisdiction to review Commission's judgment on heroin amount possessed
by prisoner when evidence properly before Commission); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539,
1545 (9th Cir. 1986) (no jurisdiction over claim that Commission abused discretion in classifying
offense when judgment exercised over range of possible choices and options). Under this view,
therefore, a court may address only two issues in reviewing a Commission decision: (1) whether it
has acted outside congressionally-set statutory limits, and (2) whether it has violated the Constitution. Coleman v. Perrill, 845 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1988).
3286. See Sacasas v. Rison, 755 F.2d 1533, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (failure to hold
hearing after five years on parole not actionable when no prejudice shown because parolee would
have had parole extended anyway).
3287. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"),
Prisoners have had little success with this claim. See Beltempo v. Hadden, 815 F.2d 873, 875 (2d
Cir. 1987) (parole guidelines 'not laws'" under ex post facto clause) (quoting DiNapoli v, Northeast Regional Parole Comm'n, 764 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985));
Timpani v. Sizer, 732 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1984) (Commission policy of applying revised guidelines retroactively only if application results in more favorable severity rating not violation of ex
postfacto clause); Royster v. Fauver, 775 F.2d 527, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1985) (parole regulations may
be laws for purposes of ex post facto clause; however, since their application did not prejudice
prisoner, no ex post facto violation); Lightsey v. Kastner, 846 F.2d 329, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1988) (no
ex postfacto violation when guideline in effect at time of offense same as guideline in effect at time of
parole determination, notwithstanding fact that law changed during interim); Sheary v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 822 F.2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1987) (federal parole guidelines not laws within
meaning of ex post facto clause); United States -v. Manni, 810 F.2d 80, 84 (6th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (Commission can apply new guidelines to prisoner when sentenced even though he relied
on old guidelines when he submitted guilty plea because parole guidelines not "laws" within prohibition of ex post facto clause); Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 953-54 (7th
Cir. 1986) (no ex post facto claim because guidelines merely interpretive and PCRA not harsher
than old statute considered as a whole); Yamamoto v. United States Parole Comm'n, 794 F.2d
1295, 1296-99 (8th Cir. 1986) (no ex post facto claim because parole guidelines not "laws" within
meaning of ex post facto clause, and application of new guidelines not more onerous); Rush v.
Petrovsky, 756 F.2d 675, 676 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (no ex post facto claim when prisoner
failed to show more favorable determination would have been reached under old guidelines); Ver-
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Commission's application of the parole guidelines was not consistent with
the trial judge's expectations at the time of sentencing. 328 8 The sentencing
328 9
judge's expectations are not binding on the Parole Commission.
The Parole Commission retains jurisdiction over the parolee until the expiration of the maximum term of the sentence, 3290 unless it determines that
early parole termination is justified.3201 After five years of parole, the parolee
has the right to a hearing to determine whether termination of supervision is
mouth v. Corrothers, 827 F.2d 599, 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1987) (Parole Commission regulations not
laws for expost facto clause purposes; prisoner has no basis to expect parole guidelines with respect
to severity ratings for cocaine offenses to remain constant in light of Commission's authority to
grant or deny parole and to create or amend guidelines); Resnick v. United States Parole Comm'n,
835 F.2d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1987) (no expostfacto violation when revised guidelines only made
explicit 'enormity of offense' factor which always has been legitimate basis for denying parole);
Warren v. United States Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 194-96 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (when prisoner
committed new crime on parole, and new guidelines promulgated after prisoner's first crime, no ex
post facto violation because prisoner charged with notice of new guidelines), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
950 (1982). But cf Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440, 443-45 (4th Cir. 1981) (retroactive application of new guidelines under Youth Corrections Act requiring consideration of severity of offense
violates ex post facto clause).
3288. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 190 (1979). The district judge who sentenced
Addonizio to a ten-year term for extortion and conspiracy expected the defendant would be eligible
for parole after serving one-third of his sentence. Id. at 181 n.3. Under the Parole Commission's
new guidelines, which placed added emphasis on the severity of the offenses, the Parole Commission
twice denied Addonizio parole based on the seriousness of his crimes. Id. at 182. Because the
prisoner was challenging his sentence and not the application of the new guidelines, the Court did
not reach the ex post facto question. Id. at 184.
3289. See Staege v. United States Parole Comm'n, 671 F.2d 266, 269 (8th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (Parole Commission may disregard sentencing court's expectations of defendant's parole
release date); Artez v. Mulcrone, 673 F.2d 1169,1170-71 (10th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (trial judge
has no enforceable expectations as to date when prisoner would be released on parole; Parole Commission has discretion to determine whether individual will serve sentence inside or outside prison);
King v. United States Parole Comm'n, 744 F.2d 1449, 1451 (11th Cir. 1984) (sentencing court has
no authority to order particular parole date; sentencing judge's recommendations not binding on
Parole Commission). But cf. Williams v. United States Parole Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1060, 1064-65
(9th Cir. 1983) (sentencing judge's parole comment form that was unavailable and not considered at
initial hearing is "new information" upon which parole date can be reconsidered).
3290. 18 U.S.C. § 4210(b)(2) (1982) (repealed 1984) (Parole Commission's jurisdiction over parolee terminates no later than maximum term's expiration, unless parolee commits another crime
after release or fails to respond to reasonable Parole Commission request, order, summons, or warrant); cf Barrier v. Beaver, 712.F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1983) (while Parole Commission cannot
keep parolee beyond jurisdictional time limit, issuance of parole violation warrant tolls statute;
because warrant execution runs statute again, Parole Commission cannot issue supplement after
execution followed by time remaining on original offense); Martin v. Luther, 689 F.2d 109, 114 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Parole Commission retains jurisdiction to revoke parole of mandatory parolee after
maximum term's expiration if violation warrant issued prior to term's expiration); Gray v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 668 F.2d 349, 350 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (§ 4210(b)(1) allows earlier
jurisdiction termination only for prisoners on mandatory release and not for those granted parole).
3291. 18 U.S.C. § 421 1(a) (1982) (repealed 1984) (Parole Commission may terminate jurisdiction
over parolee prior to expiration of maximum term). Beginning two years after release on parole, the
Parole Commission must review the parolee's status at least annually-to decide whether to terminate supervision. Id. § 4211(b).
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appropriate. 3292 At that time the Parole Commission must terminate super-

vision unless it decides that the parolee is likely to engage in criminal
acts.

32 93

Due Process Considerations in Parole Decisions.
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 3294 the Supreme Court
held that state prisoners do not have a constitutionally protected interest in
parole unless a parole statute contains mandatory language restricting the
parole board's discretion in making its decision. 3295 In such a case, a pris-

oner gains a legitimate expectation of parole that cannot be denied without

due process. 3296 In Greenholtz, an informal hearing related to the parole de3297
cision and a statement of the reasons for the denial satisfied due process.
Some statutes or regulations merely provide that the parole board "may"
release an inmate if certain criteria are met. Such statutes do not create a
3292. 18 U.S.C. § 4211(c)(1) (1982) (repealed 1984); see United States ex rel. Pullia v. Luther,
635 F.2d 612, 616-17 (7th Cir. 1980) (under § 4211, parolee has right to hearing and decision on
parole termination after five years unless Commission first terminates supervision without hearing);
Tatum v. Christensen, 786 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986) (parolee entitled to automatic extension
hearing, not automatic release, after five years of parole); cf Sacasas v. Rison, 755 F.2d 1533, 153536 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (proper remedy to enforce right to hearing after five years is writ of
mandamus, not habeas corpus).
3293. 18 U.S.C. § 421 1(c)(1) (1982) (repealed 1984); cf Sacasas v. Rison, 755 F.2d 1533, 1534-35
(11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (while parole statute mandates hearing after five years to determine
whether to extend parole, no actual prejudice found from failure to hold hearing when likely Parole
Commission would extend parole period).
3294. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
3295. In Greenholtz, a Nebraska statute provided that the Board of Parole "shall" release an
inmate "unless" it concludes that reasons require otherwise. Id. at 11. The Court held that the
mandatory nature of the language created an expectancy of release or "liberty interest" which was
entitled to some constitutional protection. Id. at 12; see Newbury v. Prisoner Review Bd., 791 F.2d
81, 85 (7th Cir. 1986) (due process requirements vary; prisoner seeking parole afforded less constitutional protection than criminal defendant at trial or prisoner at parole revocation hearing). But see
D'Amato v. United States Parole Comm'n, 837 F.2d 72, 76 (2d. Cir. 1988) (Parole Commission's
internal procedures manual does not create an expectancy of release entitled to due process
protection).
3296. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12 (statutory language dictating that board "shall" release inmate "unless" one of four reasons found creates presumption that parole release will be granted,
giving rise to legitimate release expectation and some constitutional protection).
3297. Id. at 15-16. The Supreme Court has held that particularizing the due process requirements requires an examination of the precise nature of the government function as well as the
private interest affected. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The Court has specified
factors in making such an analysis: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through procedures used; and (3) the government's interest. Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see Newbury v. Prisoner Review Bd., 791 F.2d 81, 85-87 (7th
Cir. 1986) (due process does not require that all three members of panel voting on parole application be present at inmate's parole hearing); Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390
(9th Cir. 1987) (due process satisfied at parole board hearing when prisoner received advance written notice of hearing, opportunity to be heard, access to all materials considered by board, and right
to be accompanied by person of his choice).
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protected liberty interest protected by due process. 3298 The Supreme Court
has held that when a parole statute does not give rise to a protected liberty

interest, the issuance of a parole notice can be revoked without a hearing. 3299

Two years after Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held that a statute governing
commutation policy did not give rise to a protected liberty interest even
though the Board of Pardons granted favorable rulings seventy-five percent
33 °°
of the time.
In Board of Pardons v. Allen, 33 0 1 the Supreme Court found that the lan-

guage of the Montana statute governing parole eligibility created a protected
liberty interest. 330 2 Although the statute directed that the Board "shall" re3298. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S. Ct. 2415, 2420-21 & n.10 (1987); see Scilds v. Mississippi
State Parole Bd., 831 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) ('"every prisoner... whose record
of conduct shows that such prisoner has ... may be released on parole' ") (quoting Miss. CODE
ANN. § 47- 7-3 (1972 & Supp. 1986)) (emphasis in original); Dace v. Mickelson, 816 F.2d 1277,
1281 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The board may issue an order to the warden of the penitentiary that the
inmate shall be paroled if it is satisfied that.. .") (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-8
(1979)) (emphasis in original); Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) ("When in its
opinion there is a reasonable probability that an inmate... can be released without detriment to the
community or to himself, the board may in its discretion release or parole such person") (quoting
Mo. REv. STAT. § 217.690 (1983)) (emphasis added by court); cf. Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 180
(1st Cir.) (because prisoner has no constitutional or inherent right to parole or good-time credit,
statute not unconstitutionally vague merely because of indeterminacy of state's parole award to
prisoner serving life sentence), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 333 (1987).
3299. See Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 21 (1981) (per curiam) (revocation of decision to grant
parole permissible because no liberty interest through statute or mutually explicit understandings).
But cf Green v. McCall, 822 F.2d 284, 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1987) (prisoners whose early effective
parole date had been set, but who had not yet been released, had protectable liberty interest entitling
them to due process hearing before rescission of early release date, whereas inmates who had received only presumptive parole release date not entitled to same procedural protections).
3300. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 461 (1981). In Dumschat the
Court distinguished an expectation of parole release, which is based on a mandatory statutory provision, from an expectation of a pardon, which is based on the statistical percentage of prior pardons granted. Id. at 465. The Court held that the pardon procedure did not give rise to a protected
liberty interest because the statute gave the Board unlimited discretion. Id. at 466. The Ninth
Circuit has held that when a prisoner sentenced without the possibility of parole had received eight
administrative reviews while in prison, each confirming that he would be paroled, the government
was estopped from revoking his parole when the error was discovered 15 months after his release.
Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 871-73 (9th Cir. 1982). The parolee's parole expectation was
created shortly after he began his sentence and was heightened by successive administrative reviews.
Id. at 872. The court held that to revoke his parole under these circumstances would violate due
process. Id. at 874.
3301. 107 S. Ct. 2415 (1987).
3302. Although the Court undertook an analysis of statutory language, the majority noted that
"[flour members of this Court are of the view that the existence of a liberty interesi in parole release
is not solely a function of the wording of the governing statute." Id. at 2418 n.3. Justices Marshall,
Brennan, and Stevens have argued that "all prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a liberty
interest of which they may not be deprived without due process, regardless of the particular statutory language that implements the parole system." Greenholtz,442 U.S. at 22 (emphasis in original).
Justice Powell has stated that "the presence of a parole system is sufficient to create a liberty interest, protected by the Constitution, in the parole-release decision." Id. at 19.
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lease prisoners "when" the criteria are met, and the statute in Greenholtz
stated that prisoners "shall" be released "unless" certain reasons require imprisonment, the Court saw no difference in the mandatory character of the
3303
language.
ParoleRevocation.
When a federal parolee is alleged to have violated
the conditions of parole, the Parole Commission may issue a summons ordering the parolee to appear before it, or it may issue a warrant and reimprison
the parolee. 3304 The Parole Commission must conduct a full parole revocation hearing within ninety days after recommitting a parolee if the defendant
either is convicted of a crime while on parole and admits violating parole
conditions, or waives the right to a preliminary hearing. 33 05 If the Commission fails to meet the ninety-day deadline, a prisoner is entitled to relief from
330 6
confinement only upon a showing of prejudice.
3303. Allen, 107 S. Ct. at 2420-21. If the statute creates substantive standards to guide parole
decisions, a liberty interest is created. See Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (regulations governing work release program create liberty interest when prisoner meets
eligibility requirements), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981). Courts are split on whether statutes
that state a prisoner may not be released unless certain requirements are met create a liberty interest. See Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F.2d 203, 205, 206 (7th Cir. 1986) (statute requiring Parole
Board give written notice and reasons for denial of parole and forbidding parole under some circumstances but never requiring it, does not grant prison inmate property or liberty interest in applying for parole); Patten v. North Dakota Parole Bd., 783 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1986) (statute
providing that "[n]o parole shall be granted to any person confined in the penitentiary or state farm
unless ... '" does not create protected liberty interest in parole) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 12-59-07 (1985)) (emphasis in original). But see Scott v. Illinois Parole & Pardon Bd., 669 F.2d
1185, 1188 (7th Cir.) (statute providing that .".t]heBoard shall not parole a person eligible for
parole if it determines that . . .'" creates protected liberty interest in parole) (quoting ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-5(c) (1979)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982).
3304. 18 U.S.C. § 4213(a) (1982) (repealed 1984).
3305. Id. § 4214(c); see D'Amato v. United States Parole Comm'n, 837 F.2d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir.
1988) (parolees already in custody on new federal charges when parole violation warrants issued not
entitled to preliminary hearing because statutory right to preliminary hearing not triggered until
warrant executed); Donn v. Baer, 828 F.2d 487, 489, 490 (8th Cir. 1987) (while Commission has
virtually complete discretiori to decide when to execute violator warrant, it lacks authority to withdraw executed warrant because execution triggers constitutional duty to provide due process protections); Still v. United States Marshal, 780 F.2d 848, 850-53 (10th Cir. 1985) (Parole Commission
may not suspend executed parole violation warrant and lodge it as detainer; once the Parole Commission executes a parole revocation warrant, it is required to provide heaing within ninety days).
But see Franklin v. Fenton, 642 F.2d 760, 763 (3d Cir. 1980) (Parole Commission may suspend
executed warrant and avoid procedural requirements of § 4214(c)); Thigpen v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 707 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); cf Alexander v. United States Parole Comm'n,
721 F.2d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1983) (Parole Commission not required to schedule revocation hearing for prisoner arrested while on pass from federal halfway house because parole term had not
commenced before arrest).
3306. See Still v. United States Marshall, 780 F.2d 848, 854 (10th Cir. 1985) (when prejudice
demonstrated, parolee credited for time served in custody under parole violation warrant). But see
Perry v. United States Parole Comm'n, 831 F.2d 811, 813 (8th Cir. 1987) (parolee not prejudiced
when parole revocation hearing initially scheduled six days past deadline and postponed at parolee's
request, and parolee failed to demonstrate loss of favorable evidence or witnesses from delay), cert.
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Beyond these statutory requirements for federal parole revocation proceedings, the due process clause provides additional protections for all prisoners in this area. 330 7 Although parolees are subject to many restrictions,
they enjoy a protected liberty interest in conditional freedom. 330 8 Moreover,
parolees rely on an implicit promise that their parole will be revoked only if
they violate their parole conditions. 330 9 Due process requires, therefore, that
parole be revoked only through a procedure designed to ensure that the finding of a violation is factually correct and that the discretionary decision to
recommit the parolee to prison is based on an accurate assessment of the
3310
parolee's behavior.
The Supreme Court has established due process requirements for each of
the two stages in a typical parole revocation proceeding.3 3 11 First, shortly
after a parolee is arrested for a parole violation, a preliminary hearing must
be held to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the parolee
violated the parole conditions. 3312 If the parolee has been convicted of a
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1230 (1988); Donn v. Baer, 828 F.2d 487, 490 (8th Cir. 1987) (defendant not
prejudiced when Commission failed to grant timely parole revocation; defendant received full credit
for time served in state custody, and defendant's opportunity to serve state sentence concurrently
with parole violator term was not frustrated); Goodman v. Keohane, 663 F.2d 1044, 1046 (11th Cir.
1981) (per curiam) (failure to demonstrate prejudice from being held 111 days after being taken into
federal custody precludes relief).
3307. The Supreme Court has held that due process protection applies to parole revocation proceedings for state prisoners. M6rrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Court held that the
parolee's interest in continued liberty is significant enough to require procedural protection, and
that the nature of the interest is within the scope of liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 481-82.
3308. See id. at 480, 482 (parolee's liberty interest not absolute but conditioned on observance of
parole conditions; parolee's liberty, although indeterminate, allows wide range of activities enjoyed
by public; termination of parole inflicts grievous loss and deserves due process protection); cf.Newbury v. Prisoner Review Bd., 791 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir. 1986) (parolee entitled to more due process
protection in parole revocation hearing than prisoner seeking parole for first time).
3309. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
3310. Id. at 484. Parole revocation requires the board to make a two-step inquiry. First, it must
determine whether the parolee violated the parole conditions. Id. at 479. Second, it must determine
whether the parolee should be recommitted to prison. Id. at 479-80. The first question involves a
retrospective factual determination. Id. at 479. The second question is more complex, requiring the
board to predict the parolee's ability to live in society. Id. at 480; see Ellard v. Alabama Bd. of
Pardons & Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 945-46 (11th Cir. 1987) (before state can declare parole granted
in clear violation of guidelines void, due process clause requires procedural protections similar to
when valid parole is revoked) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988); see Gholston v. Jones, 848 F.2d
1156, 1160-61 (11th Cir. 1988) (parolee's due process right violated when parole revocation based

solely on parole officer's unsworn violation report stating.1that parolee had engaged in criminal
mischief, because there was no indication parolee requested parole officer's presence at parole revocation hearing or had access to report).
3311. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
3312. In Morrissey, the Court announced that the hearing officer cannot have any connection
with the case, and that the parolee must receive notice of the alleged violations and hearing's purpose. Id. at 486-87; see Miller v. Hadden, 811 F.2d 743, 747 (2d Cir. 1987) (notice requirement met
when parolee received written warrant that listed only allegations on which revocation based). The
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crime while on parole, however, no preliminary hearing is required because
the conviction itself establishes probable cause to believe that there has been
a parole violation.3 313 Second, once probable cause has been established, the
parole authority must hold a revocation hearing, 3 14 if the parolee so desires,

within a reasonable time after the parolee has been taken into custody. 3315

parolee is entitled to an opportunity to appear and present evidence on his behalf. Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 487. The parolee is also entitled to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the
hearing officer determines that the witness would be subject to risk of harm if his identity were
disclosed. Id. If the hearing officer determines that probable cause exists to hold the parolee for a
final revocation decision, the officer must make a summary of the proceedings and a statement of
the reasons and evidence supporting the probable cause finding. Id. at 487; cf Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (due process does not require that parolees receive
bail hearing prior to conclusion of revocation proceedings).
If no preliminary hearing is held, the parolee may be entitled to damages for the deprivation of
his due process rights. See Wolfel- v. Sanborn, 666 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir. 1981) (defendant
entitled to damages when held for 27 days without preliminary hearing to determine probable cause
of parole violation), vacated on other grounds, 458 U.S 1102 (1982); cf. Pierre v. Washington Bd. of
Prison Terms & Paroles, 699 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1983) (preliminary hearing unnecessary with
prompt final parole revocation hearing satisfied due process requirements). But see Heath v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 788 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1986) (joint dispositional hearing permissible when
prisoner not prejudiced by delay), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 253 (1986).
3313. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86 n.7 (1976); see Kenner v. Martin, 648 F.2d 1080, 1081
(6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (revocation hearing not required when parolee convicted of federal
offense); cf Doyle v. Elsea, 658 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (preliminary hearing
unnecessary when defendant accused of, and in custody for, crime committed while on parole, even
though not convicted).
3314. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487-88. But cf Pickens v. Butler, 814 F.2d 237, 239-40 (5th Cir.)
(parolee entitled to show excuse for parole violation only when factfinder has discretion to continue
parole; because Louisiana law required parole forfeiture upon felony conviction, felon had no due
process right to final revocation hearing), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 284 (1987).
Before the revocation hearing, the parolee must receive written notice of the alleged parole violation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; see D'Amato v. United States Parole Comm'n, 837 F.2d 72, 77-78
(2d Cir. 1988) (notice adequate although notice of charges to be considered at parole revocation
hearing not given, because notice given was of charges to be considered at initial parole hearing and
same offenses were basis for both hearings); Bryan v. Petrovsky, 726 F.2d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (Morrissey notice requirement satisfied when parolee received violation warrant charging four violations; failure to receive Commission's letter finding probable cause on all charges did
not invalidate parole revocation hearing); Raines v. United States Parole Comm'n, 829 F.2d 840,
843 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (notice inadequate when parole denied opportunity to prepare
defense because warrant not specific enough to inform parolee that time spent on parole subject to
forfeiture). But see D'Amato v. United States Parole Comm'n, 837 F.2d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1988)
(Parole Commission not required to give parolee prior notice that forfeiture of time spent on parole
resulted from new conviction during parole). At the hearing, the evidence against the parolee must
be disclosed, and the parolee must be given an opportunity to present witnesses and documentary
evidence. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. In addition, the parolee must be allowed to cross-examine
witnesses unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for preventing such confrontations.
Id.; see Country v. Bartee, 808 F.2d 686, 687 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses not absolute because revocation hearing not part of criminal
prosecution).
3315. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488 (two-month delay not necessarily unreasonable); Hanahan
v. Luther, 693 F.2d 629, 634-35 (7th Cir. 1982) (eight-month delay not necessarily unreasonable),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); Doyle v. Elsea, 658 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
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At this hearing, the parolee may show either that the violation did not occur
or that mitigating circumstances should preclude revocation. 33 16 A "neutral
and detached" body, such as the parole board, must make the revocation
decision. 3317 This body is required to make a written statement of the evidence and the reasons supporting revocation of parole. 3318 Due process does
not require appointment of counsel for all indigent parolees in revocation
33 19
hearings.
In Moody v. Daggett,3320 the Supreme Court held that when a parolee is

convicted of a crime committed while on parole, the Parole Commission may
issue a parole revocation warrant but stay its execution until the prisoner has
served the sentence for the crime committed during parole. 3321 Federal pa(three-month delay reasonable); ef Spotted Bear v. McCall, 648 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1980)
(failure to hold speedy revocation hearing when parolee serving sentence for another crime does not
prejudice defendant). United States Parole Commission procedures, however, require a parole revocation hearing upon the return of a prisoner serving a state or local sentence to a federal institution,
or upon completion of 24 months in confinement on the state charge, whichever is earlier. 28
C.F.R. § 2.47(b)(1)(i) (1986).
3316. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488.
3317. Id. at 489.
3318. Id.
3319. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). The Court held that the parole agency
must be allowed considerable discretion in its decision whether to appoint counsel. Id. Counsel
should be provided when the parolee requests it and has a timely and colorable claim that he did not
commit the violation, or that substantial reasons justify or mitigate the violation. Id. The agency
also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the parolee appears to be capable of
speaking effectively pro se. Id. at 790-9 1. If the agency refuses the request for counsel, it should
succinctly state the grounds for refusal in the record. Id. at 791. The Tenth Circuit, however, has
interpreted federal parole statutes to require appointment of counsel for indigent parolees in parole
revocation proceedings. Baldwin v. Benson, 584 F.2d 953, 958-59 (10th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (citing
18 U.S.C.A. § 4214(a)(2)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)).
3320. 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
3321. Id. at 87. The Commission derives its authority to issue warrants from 18 U.S.C.
§ 4214(b)(1) (1982) (repealed 1984); see Heath v. United States Parole Comm'n, 788 F.2d 85, 91 (2d
Cir.) (placing detainer against parolee does not constitute execution of parole violation warrant),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 953 (1986). Instead of staying the execution of a parole warrant, the Parole
Commission may decide, after a hearing, to dismiss the warrant or to revoke parole immediately so
that the parole violation term runs concurrently with the sentence for the subsequent conviction.
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1976); see D'Amato v. United States Parole Comm'n, 837
F.2d 72, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1988) (Parole Commission has authority to require parole violation terms to
be commenced following parolee's release from new term of imprisonment); Garafola v. Wilkinson,
721 F.2d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 1983) (Parole Commission has authority to deny federal prisoner credit
for time spent while on parole upon revocation based on subsequent state conviction), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 905 (1984); Battle v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 420 (5th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (Parole Commission, in revoking special parole term, has discretion to impose term consecutively to new sentence); United States v. Newton, 698 F.2d 770, 772 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(Parole Commission has discretion to determine whether unexpired time on parole violator's original sentence will run concurrently with new sentence imposed and to order forfeiture of time spent
on parole); Doyle v. Elsea, 658 F.2d 512, 514-15 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (Parole Commission
has discretion to order parole violator's term to run consecutively with new sentence imposed);
Harris v. Day, 649 F.2d 755, 760 (10th Cir. 1981) (Parole Commission has discretion to determine
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rolees who have such a detainer lodged against them may submit to the Parole Commission written information, prepared with the assistance of
counsel, attempting to mitigate or explain the alleged violation. 3322 If the

Parole Commission fails to review the detainer within 180 days, the prisoner
may seek mandamus to compel review. 3323 Subsequent to a dispositional re-

view of the detainer, the prisoner has a right to a revocation hearing after
serving twenty-four months of the intervening sentence or upon return to a
3 324
federal institution.

whether unexpired time on parole violator's original sentence will run concurrently or consecutively
with new sentence imposed); cf Franklin v. Fenton, 642 F.2d 760, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1980) (Commission may defer parole revocation pending outcome of subsequent prosecution). If a prisoner is serving a state charge concurrently with a federal charge and is later paroled from the federal charge
and released to the state prison, the confinement in state prison will not be considered continuation
of federal confinement for purposes of determining the parolee's entitlement to credit against the
federal sentence. Weeks v. Quinlan, 838 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1988).
3322. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(b)(1) (1982) (repealed 1984).
3323. See Heath v. United States Parole Comm'n, 788 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.) (writ of mandamus
appropriate remedy for § 4214 default, not writ of habeas corpus), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 953 (1986);
Carlton v. Keohane, 691 F.2d 992, 993 (1lth Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (Parole Commission's failure
to hold dispositional review within 180 days ordinarily warrants writ of mandamus to compel review; release not appropriate remedy in absence of prejudice or bad faith); Sutherland v. McCall,
709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (writ of mandamus appropriate remedy for § 4214 default, not
writ of habeas corpus to compel release on parole).
3324. 28 C.F.R. § 2.47(b)(l)(A)-(B) (1986); see Heath v. United States Parole Comm'n, 788 F.2d
85, 91 (2d Cir.) (dispositional revocation hearing timely when held less than 24 months after parolee
was arrested and convicted of crime committed while on parole), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 953 (1986).

